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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND 
REcORD No. 8205 
JOHN F. RUTLEDGE, 
v. 
TENTH DISTRICT COMMITTEE OF THE 
VIRGINIA STATE BAR, 
APPENDIX 
COMPLAINT OF TENTH DISTRICT 
Appellant, 
Appellee. 
The Tenth District Committee of the Virginia State Bar created 
pursuant to the provisions of Section 13 of Article IV of Part Six of 
the Rules for the Integration of the Virginia State Bar as duly adopted 
and promulgated by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, re-
spectfully reports the following complaint against Alfred L. Hiss and 
John F. Rutledge, licensed attorneys at law practicing in Arlington 
County, Virginia, and who have offices at the addresses shown in the 
caption hereof. 
1. That for a period of more than seven years immediately prior to 
September, 1967, Alfred L. Hiss and John F. Rutledge were partners 
in a law firm known as Hiss and Rutledge. 
2. That both said Alfred L. Hiss and John F. Rutledge were en-
gaged in the practice of law in Arlington County during the said 
period of their partnership. 
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3. That during the period. ftotn.1960 to 1967 said Alfred L. Hiss 
and John F. Rutledge did comingle funds placed with them in trust 
by their clients with their own pers-onal funds. 
4. That during the period from 1960 to 1967 said Alfred L. Hiss 
and John F. Rutledge did improperly use by appropriating same to 
their personal use large sums of money held by them in trust for others. 
5. That said John F. Rutledge and/ or Alfred L. Hiss subsequently 
replaced all trust funds which had been misappropriated by them, and 
no owner of any of the trust funds so misappropriated suffered any 
pecuniary loss. 
6. That it is for the best interests of the defendants in this case, 
the Bar as a whole, and the publi~ that the proceedings herein remain 
confidential and that the petition in this case be sealed from the time 
of filing and the file opened only under the direction of the Court. 
7. That the foregoing acts constitute violations of Canons Numbers 
11, 29, and 32 of Section II (Canons of Professional Ethics) of Part 
Six of the Rules of Integration of the Virginia State Bar as adopted 
and promulgated by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia as they 
existed at the time said acts occurred. 
The Tenth District Committee of the Virginia State Bar directed 
that a verified complaint in this matter be filed in the Clerk's Office of 
the Circuit Court of Arlington County, Virginia, for such further pro-
ceedings thereon in accordance with the statute in such cases made and 
provided. A copy hereof is being filed with the Secretary of the 
Virginia State Bar in accordance with the Rules for Integration of the 
Virginia State Bar. 
* * * 
STIPULATION OF FACTS 
It is hereby agreed and stipulated by and between the Tenth Dis-
triet,Committee of the Virginia State Bar, as evidenced by the signature 
of its counsel, and Alfred L. Hiss and John F. Rutledge, as evidenced 
by the signatures of Messrs. Hiss and Rutledge and their respective 
counsel, that the following facts are submitted to the Court without 
the necessity of taking formal proof and are tendered to the Court as 
evidence in this cause : 
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1. That Messrs. Hiss and Rutledge were engaged in the general 
practice of law in Arlington County, Virginia, as partners from 1960. 
through September, 1967 and prior to that time. 
2. That the firm of Hiss and Rutledge maintained a Trustee ac-
count in the First National Bank of Arlington, Arlington, Virginia, and 
that trust escrow funds were deposited by the firm of Hiss and Rutledge 
in that account. In addition to trust escrow funds, some legal fees 
earned by the partnership from real estate settlements and closings were 
not removed from this account at the time of said settlements and 
closings. Partnership funds were commingled with client trust funds. 
3. That prior to 1960 and from 1960 up to 1967, Messrs. Hiss and 
Rutledge did withdraw and disburse for their personal use from the 
aforesaid trust bank account funds which were in excess of any amount 
to which they were entitled. 
4. That in March, 1967 an audit of the said trust account in the 
First National Bank of Arlington was requested and made by a title 
insurance company which insured real estate transactions in connection 
with which the partnership of Hiss and Rutledge had deposited client 
funds in the said trust account. The auditors determined that a sub-
stantial cash shortage existed in the account. The audit also revealed 
that substantial amounts had been wrongfully disburseq from the said 
trust account for purposes other than those for which the clients of Hiss 
and Rutledge had entrusted money to the law firm. It also revealed 
that a shortage had existed in the account for several years. 
5. That Messrs. Hiss and Rutledge knew in the year 1963 that a 
substantial shortage existed in the said trust account and they knew 
that a shortage existed in the account during the years from 1963 
through March, 1967. 
6. That when confronted with the shortage in the account, Messrs. 
Hiss and/or Rutledge deposited funds sufficient to cover the amounts 
due those clients of the law firm with which the title insurance company 
was concerned. 
7. That the evidence given before the Tenth District ·Grievance 
Committee did not disclose that any client of Hiss and Rutledge suf-
fered any pecuniary loss as a result of the aforesaid transactions. 
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8. That the firm of Hiss and Rutledge dissolved as a partnership, 
and since September, 1967, each of the parties has been practicing 
individually within Arlington County. 
9. That Mr. Hiss and Mr. Rutledge deny the willful and deliber-
ate misappropriation of trust funds, but acknowledge that substantial 
shortages occurred in the trust escrow funds, for which they acknowl-
edge a responsibility. 
This stipulation is submitted in lieu of oral testimony and agreed 
to by all parties to this cause, as evidenced by the signatures appearing 
below. 
* * * 
ORDER 
This matter came on to be heard on this 27th day of September, 
1971, upon the Report and Complaint of the Tenth District Com-
mittee of the Virginia State Bar; upon the express waiver by the de-
fendants of the issuance of a Rule as required by Section 54-7 4 ( 1 ) of 
the Code of Virginia and upon further express waiver by the defend-
ants of any procedural matters or notice of hearing; upon the issues 
joined; upon the Stipulation of Facts filed with the Court; upon the 
statements and arguments presented in open hearing before the Court; 
and upon the recommendation of the Tenth District Committee that the 
licenses of the defendants to practice law in the Commonwealth of 
Virginia be suspended for a period of six ( 6) months. 
And it appearing to the Court that the allegations of the Report and 
Complaint are true; that the defendants committed the acts described 
therein as evidenced by the Stipulation of Facts filed herein; but that 
no person, partnership or corporation suffered any loss by reason of such 
acts; and that the defendants by reason of their acts are guilty of 
unprofessional conduct within the purview of Section 54-7 4 of the Code 
of Virginia. 
WHEREFORE, it appearing that the recommendation of the 
Tenth District Committee is proper and should be accepted by the 
Court, it is 
ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the licenses of Alfred L. Hiss 
and John F. Rutledge to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia 
are hereby suspended for a period of six ( 6) months effective October 1, 
1971, through April 1, 1972, and that during said period of suspension 
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Alfred L. Hiss and John F. Rutledge shall not in any manner engage in 
the practice of law in the Commonwealth of Virginia directly or in-
directly, nor hold themselves out as lawyers, in public or private, nor 
recommend nor refer cases or clients to other lawyers, and said defend-
ants shall each surrender their license on or before October 1, 1971, to 
the Senior Judge of the Circuit Court of Arlington County, Virginia, 
until the period of suspension expires. It is further AD JUDGED and 
ORDERED that, if the defendants herein violate the terms of the 
suspension of their licenses to practice law, then the Tenth District 
Committee of the Virginia State Bar shall have the right to reopen this 
case for further disciplinary action against the defendants. 
It is further ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the Clerk of this 
Court shall cause a copy of this order to be placed in the Court's Order 
Book which would permit public inspection and the Clerk of this Court 
will further send a certified copy of this order to the Secretary of the 
Virginia State Bar, Imperial Building, Fifth and Franklin Streets, Rich-
mond, Virginia, 23219. 
Entered: September 27, 1971. 
* * * 
MOTION TO REOPEN 
Comes now the Tenth District Committee of The Virginia State 
Bar, Plaintiff, by counsel, and moves this Honorable Court to reopen 
this case for further disciplinary action against the Defendant, John F. 
Rutledge, and in support thereof, alleges as follows: 
1. That the Defendant, Alfred L. Hiss, is n.o longer before the 
Court by reason of his voluntary surrender of his license, which sur-
render was accepted by the Supreme Court of Virginia on the 27th day 
of January, 1972; a copy of the Mandate of the Court is attached 
hereto, made a part hereof and marked Exhibit "A". 
2. That the Order of this Court dated September 27, 1971, stated 
in part as follows: 
"ADJUDGED and ORDERED 
"That the licenses of Alfred L. Hiss and John F. Rutledge to prac-
tice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia are hereby suspended 
for a period of six months, effective October 1, 1971 tlirough 
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April 1, 1972, and that during said period of suspension Alfred L. 
Hiss and John F. Rutledge shall not in any manner engage in the 
practice of law in the Commonwealth of Virginia directly and 
indirectly, nor hold themselves out as lawyers, in public or private, 
nor recommend nor refer cases or clients to other lawyers, and said 
defendants shall each surrender their license on or before Oc-
tober 1, 1971, to the Senior Judge of the Circuit Court of Arlington 
County, Virginia, until the period of suspension expires. It is 
further ADJUDGED and ORDERED that, if the defendants 
herein violate the terms of the suspension of their licenses to prac-
tice law, then the Tenth District Committee of the Virginia State 
Bar shall have the right to reopen this case for further disciplinary 
action against the defendants." 
3. Prior to the entry of the Court's Order on September 27, 1971, 
Mr. Rutledge had contacted three primary clients, among others, to-
wit: Phonix Properties, Inc., Rip Development Company, Inc. and 
J. Fuller Groom Realty Company, and informed them that he expected 
to be suspended from the practice of law and that Mr. Edward P. 
Brill, Jr., an attorney, was taking over his practice during his suspen-
sion. He further informed these clients that he would be working for 
Mr. Brill as a title examiner and abstractor during the period of the 
suspension. 
4. That subsequent to the entry of the Order of the Court on 
September 27, 1971, Mr. Rutledge concluded an arrangement with 
Mr. Brill, under which arrangement Mr. Brill rented Mr. Rutledge's 
office for $800.00 a month, his office equipment at the rate of $275 
per month, and agreed to retain Mr. Rutledge's three secretaries, at 
the total sum, after withholding taxes, of $348.14 per week. During 
this period of time, Mr. Rutledge paid rental on the premises to the 
landlord in the sum of $439.75 per month. 
5. From October 1, 1971 to April 1, 1972, Mr. Brill maintained 
his own office at 2054 N. 14th Street, Arlington, Virginia, and would 
appear in the office rented from Mr. Rutledge only to hold a settlement 
on a real estate transaction or to review real estate title insurance 
binders or applications or to review papers relating to real estate trans-
actions, all of which emanated from Phoenix Properties, Inc., Rip 
Development Company, Inc. or J. Fuller Groom Realty Company. 
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Mr. Brill had never represented any of said corporations prior to the 
suspension of Mr. Rutledge and has not performed any services for 
them since the termination of the suspension. These three clients of 
Mr. Rutledge, during the period of suspension, sent real estate con-
tracts for settlement to Mr. Brill at the address of the office he rented 
from Mr. Rutledge. These contracts would be prepared for title exami-
nation by Mr. Rutledge's ex-secretaries, Mr. Rutledge would examine 
the titles, the secretaries would prepare the papers for settlement, and 
Mr. Brill would check the papers and conduct the closing. No closings 
received from a client of Mr. Rutledge were ever held or handled in 
the office of Mr. Brill at 2054 N. 14th Street, Arlington, Virginia. 
6. During the period of time that Mr. Rutledge was employed by 
Mr. Brill, he was paid $1200 in the nature of salary. Mr. Brill paid, in 
addition to the other payments set forth above, the telephone bills for 
Mr. Rutledge's office and the xerox bill. Mr. Brill collected all fees 
from the real estate closings, paid out rent and office equipment rental 
to Mr. Rutledge, in addition to Mr. Rutledge's salary, paid the secre-
taries and retained approximately $572 over the six-month period as 
his fee. A copy of the expense and income statement of Mr. Rutledge's 
office was submitted by Mr. Brill to the Committee and is attached 
hereto, made a part hereof, and marked Exhibit "B,'. 
7. The effect of the arrangement between Mr. Rutledge and 
Mr. Brill was such that Mr. Brill agreed to pay out of the net settle-
ment fees the expense of maintaining the office rented from Mr. Rut-
ledge, retain a small amount for himself and pay the balance, if any, 
to Mr. Rutledge as salary. 
8. Your Committee has found that during the period of the sus-
pension, Mr. Rutledge did not directly practice law; that he did remove 
all his signs from the office; that he informed callers, through his secre-
taries, that he was not available to practice law; and that he did not 
directly contravene the Court's Order of September 27, 1971. 
9. That because of the arrangement as alleged herein, it is the 
opinion of the Tenth District Committee that he was: 
( 1) Referring and recommending cases to other lawyers (that 
is, Mr. Brill) on a continuing basis by reason of the arrangement set 
forth herein, and 
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( 2) Indirectly practicing law, both in violation of the said 
Order. 
WHEREFORE, your Committee moves this Court to reopen this 
case for further disciplinary action to the extent that the Court may 
see fit to take such action. 
* * * 
ANSWER AND GROUNDS OF DEFENSE 
Comes now the defendant, John F. Rutledge, by counsel, and for 
answer and grounds of defense in the above entitled matter, states as 
follows: 
1. That Paragraph 1 of the Motion to reopen is not applicable to 
this defendant inasmuch as they ceased being partners in 1967 and the 
Court Order in question relates to October 1, 1971. The matters in-
volving the surrender of license by Mr. Hiss do not involve Mr. Rutledge. 
2. This defendant admits the allegations in Paragraph 2 of the 
Motion to Reopen. 
3. The defendant admits he in good faith, informed the clients 
alleged regarding a possible suspension from the practice of law and 
further he could not practice law during the suspension period, that this 
was done before the Court Order was in its final form, that he acted 
in total good faith, that he did not intend to practice law during the 
period of suspension, nor to violate any Court Order. 
4. That an agreement was made with Mr. Brill, which was in-
tended in good faith, that the rental was arrived at in good faith on 
reliance of competent professional advice by an accountant. 
5. Mr. Brill handled all the real estate transactions, the closings, 
etc., and took all the time necessary for the handling of these. 
6. Defendant was paid on the basis of services as a title abstracter, 
during the six month period. 
7. This is not a fair interpretation of the agreement. 
8. Admits. 
9. Denies he did, or intended to practice law indirectly or in any 
manner during the period of suspension. 
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10. Good faith attempts to be given a standard by which :he wa~ 
to conduct himself during the period of suspens~on ~foresaid were "inade: 
Uppermost in his mind was to conduct him:s·elf within the· Order of 
the Court dated September 27, 1971, and at no time did he deliberately 
or consciously violate said Order. 
WHEREFORE, this defendant moves this Honorable Court to 
dismiss the Motion to Reopen this case. 
Income: 
* * * 
Recapitulation Of Records 
Of Edward P. Brill, Jr. 
T Nos ................................................................................................................... 21,268.50 
Nov. Farrell-Mcintyre ....................................................................................... 30.00 
Nov. Wilson Riggs................................................................................................... 61.50 
Dec. CIT 6823 ......................................... ............................................................... 75.00 
Dec. Meebo ................................................................................................................. . 
Jan. Curry-Ans. Service ............................................................................. . 
Jan. Closing Cases .............................................................................................. .. 
Jan. Holcomb ........................................................................................................... . 
Feb. Resub.-Chain Bridge Forest. ....................................................... . 
Feb. CIT Great Forest .................................................................................. .. 
Feb. Horton .............................................................................................................. . 
Feb. Closing Cases ............................................................................................... . 
Feb. Leesburg Pike ............................................................................................... . 












Total Income ................................................................................................ 22,306.74 
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Expenses: 
Salaries-secretarial ............................................. 9,051.'64 
J. F. Rutledge-office rent .............................. 4,800.00 
J. F. Rutledge-office equipment ............... 1,650.00 
J. F. Rutledge-salary .......................................... 1,200.00 
Withholding Taxes-IRS ................................. 2,888. 70 
Jan. Virginia Income Tax ........................................... .. 
Mar. Virginia Employment Commission ........... . 
189.06 
74.04 
Mar. State Tax Commissioner.................................... 179.10 
C & P Telephone Co. ................................................ 1,328.58 
Southern Office Supply ...................................... . 
Xerox Corp ................................................................. .. 
Oct. Arlington Rubber Stamp Co ...................... .. 
Nov. Photo-Data Inc ........................................................ .. 
Nov. Pitney-Bowes .............................................................. . 
Dec. Treasurer, Arlington County-







Total Expense ............................................................................................. 21,733.90 
Total ,Gain ...................................................................................................... 572.84 
+ 196.54 
769.38 
* * * 
ORDER 
THIS MATTER came on to be heard on this 31st day of August, 
1972, upon the Motion to Reopen filed by the Tenth District Com-
mittee of the Virginia State Bar; and upon the statements and argu-
mentS..presented in open hearing before the Court; 
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AND WHEREUPON the Court, after the witnesses were sworn, 
heard the testimony tire tenus, and at the conclusion thereof _the de-
fendant, by his counsel, made a motion to dismiss, whic4 motion was 
denied by the Court; 
AND THEREUPON the Court being of the opinion that the 
defendant did refer matters to other lawyers; that the defendant did 
indirectly engaged in the practice of law at a benefit and profit to him-
seH; and that the defendant violated the terms of the Order entered 
by this Court on September 27, 1971 ; it is, in consideration thereof., 
ADJUDGED and ORD·ERED that the license of John F. Rut-
ledge to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia be, and the 
same hereby is, suspended for a period of three years effective from the 
16th day of September, 1972, to the 16th day of September, 1975; and 
that during said period of suspension John F. Rutledge shall not in 
any manner engage in the practice of law in the Commonwealth of 
Virginia directly or indirectly, nor hold himseH out as a lawyer, in 
public or private, nor recommend or refer cases or clients to other 
lawyers, and said defendant shall surrender his license on or before 
November 30, 1972, to the Senior Judge of the Circuit Court of Ar-
lington County, Virginia, until the period of suspension expires. 
It is further AD JUDGED and ORDERED that, if the defendant 
herein violates the terms of the suspension of his license to practice 
law, then the Tenth District Committee of the Virginia State Bar shall 
have the right to reopen this case for further disciplinary action against 
him. 
It is further ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the Clerk of this 
Court shall cause a copy of this Order to be placed in the Court's Order 
Book which would permit public inspection and the Clerk of this 
Court will further send a certified copy of this Order to the Secretary 
of the Virginia State Bar, Imperial Building, 5th and Franklin Street, 
Richmond, Virginia, 232·19, to which Order the defendant, by counsel, 
objected. 
Entered: November 15, 1972. 
* * * 
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WRI'ITEN STATEMENT OF FACTS, TESTIMONY, AND 
- OTHER INCIDENTS OF THE CASE 
The defendant, John F. Rutledge, was suspended from the direct 
or indirect practice of law by Order of the Court dated September 27, 
1971. A copy of this Order and the Stipulation of Facts filed in the 
original disbarment proceedings are considered a part of the record 
herein. In June, 1972, the plaintiff, The Tenth District Committee of 
the Virginia State Bar, moved the Court to reopen the case for further 
disciplinary action against the defendant. 
The material allegations in support of the Motion to reopen, the 
defendant's response thereto and the evidence presented were as follows: 
1. The parties agreed that the Order dated September 27, 1971, 
provided in part as follows: 
"ADJUDGED and ORDERED 
"That the licenses of Alfred L. Hiss and John F. Rutledge to prac-
tice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia are hereby suspended for a 
period of six months, effective October 1, 1971, through April 1, 1972, 
and that during said period of suspension Alfred L. Hiss and John F. 
Rutledge shall not in any manner engage in the practice of law in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia directly or indirectly, nor hold themselves 
out as lawyers, in public or private, nor recommend nor refer cases or 
clients to other lawyers, and said defendants shall each surrender their 
license on or before October 1, 1971, to the Senior Judge of the Circuit 
Court of Arlington County, Virginia, until the period of suspension 
expires. It is further AD JUDGED and ORDERED that, if the de-
fendants herein violate the terms of the suspension of their licenses to 
practice law, then the Tenth District Committee of the Virginia State 
Bar shall have the right to reopen this case for further disciplinary action 
against the defendants." 
2. The plaintiff alleged that: 
"Prior to the entry of the Court's Order on September 27, 1971, 
Mr. Rutledge had contacted three primary clients, among others, to-wit: 
Phoenix Properties, Inc., Rip Development Company, Inc. and J. Ful-
ler Groom Realty Company, and informed them that he expected to be 
suspended from the practice of law and that Mr. Edward P. Brill, Jr., 
an attorney, was taking over his practice during his suspension. He 
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further informed these clients that he would be working for Mr. Brill as 
a title examiner and abstractor during the period of the suspension." 
The defendant responded: 
"The defendant admits that he in good faith, informed the clients 
alleged regarding a possible suspension from the practice of law and 
further he could not practice law during the suspension period, that 
this was done before the Court Order was in its final form, that he 
acted in total good faith, that he did not intend to practice law during 
the period of suspension, nor to violate any Court Order." 
3. The plaintiff alleged that: 
"Prior to the entry of the Court's Order on September 27, 1971, 
Mr. Rutledge had concluded an arrangement with Mr. Brill, under 
which arrangement Mr. Brill rented Mr. Rutledge's office for $800.00 
a month, his office equipment at the rate of $27 5 per month, and agreed 
to retain Mr. Rutledge's three secretaries, at the total sum, after with-
holding taxes, of $348.14 per week. During this period of time, Mr. 
Rutledge paid rental on the premises to the landlord in the sum of 
$439.75 per month." 
The defendant responded: 
"That an agreement was made with Mr. Brill, which was intended 
in good faith, that the rental was arrived at in good faith on reliance 
of competent professional advice by an accountant." 
4. The plaintiff alleged that: 
"From October 1, 1971 to April 1, 1972, Mr. Brill maintained his 
own office at 2054 N. 14th Street, Arlington, Virginia, and would 
appear in the office rented from Mr. Rutledge only to hold a settlement 
on a real estate transaction or to review real estate title insurance bind-
ers or applications or to review papers relating to real estate transac-
tions, all of which emanated from Phoenix Properties, Inc., Rip De-
velopment Company, Inc. or J. Fuller Groom Realty Company. Mr. 
Brill had never represented any of said corporations prior to the 
suspension of Mr. Rutledge and has not performed any services for 
them since the termination of the suspension. These three clients of 
Mr. Rutledge, during the period of suspension, sent real estate con-
tracts for settlement to Mr. Brill at the address of the office he rented 
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from Mr. Rutledge. These contracts would be prepared for title exami-
nation by Mr. Rutledge's ex-secretaries, Mr. Rutledge would examine 
the titles, the secretaries would prepare the papers for settlement, and 
Mr. Brill would check the papers and conduct the closing. No closings 
received from a client of Mr. Rutledge were ever held or handled in 
the office of Mr. Brill at 2054 N. 14th Street, Arlington, Virginia." 
The defendant responded that: 
"Mr. Brill handled all the real estate transactions, the closings, etc., 
and took all the time necessary for the handling of these. 
5. The plaintiff alleged that: 
"During the period of time that Mr. Rutledge was employed by 
Mr. Brill, he was paid $1200 in the nature of salary. Mr. Brill paid, 
in addition to the other payments set forth above, the telephone bills 
for Mr. Rutledge's office and the xerox bill. Mr. Brill collected all fees 
from the real estate closings, paid out rent and office equipment rental 
to Mr. Rutledge, in addition to Mr. Rutledge's salary, paid the secre-
taries and retained approximately $5 72 over the six-month period as 
his fee." 
The defendant admitted that: 
"Defendant was paid on the basis of services as a title abstractor, 
during the six month period." 
6. The plaintiff alleged that: 
"The effect of the arrangement between Mr. Rutledge and Mr. 
Brill was such that Mr. Brill agreed to pay out of the net settlement 
fees the expenses of maintaining the office rented from Mr. Rutledge, 
retain a small amount for himself and pay the balance, if any, to Mr. 
Rutledge as salary." 
The defendant answered that: 
"This allegation is not a fair interpretation of the agreement." 
7. The plaintiff alleged and the defendant admitted that: 
"Your Committee has found that during the period of the suspen-
sion, Mr. Rutledge did not directly practice law; that he did remove 
all his signs from the office; that he informed callers, through his 
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secretaries, that he was not available to practice law; and that he did 
not directly contravene the Court's Order of September 27, 1971." 
8. The plaintiff alleged: 
"That because of the arrangement as alleged herein, it is the 
opinion of the Tenth District Committee that he was: 
( 1) Referring and recommending cases to other lawyers (that 
is, Mr. Brill) on a continuing basis by reason of the arrangement set 
forth herein, and 
(2) Indirectly practicing law, both in violation of the said Order." 
The defendant concluded his response as follows: 
"Denies that he did, or intended to practice law indirectly or in 
any manner during the period of suspension." 
"Good faith attempts to be given a standard by which he was to 
conduct himself during the period of suspension aforesaid were made. 
Uppermost in his mind was to conduct himself within the Order of 
the Court dated September 27, 1971, and at no time did he deliber-
ately or consciously violate said Order." 
9. The Court reconvened on August 31, 1972, pursuant to the 
Motion to Reopen. Witnesses were sworn and excluded. The Tenth 
District Committee, by counsel, proceeded to present evidence in sup-
port of the Motion. A Summary of the hearing follows: 
A. In its opening statement, the Tenth District Committee 
charged that the defendant, John F. Rutledge, had engaged in the 
indirect practice of law during the period of his six month suspension. 
It alleged that Rutledge had contacted three substantial real estate 
clients to advise them that he would be suspended but that another 
attorney, Mr. Brill, would take over the legal work connected with 
the loan settlements. During the six month period, Mr. Brill allegedly 
paid office rent of $4,800, equipment rent of $1,650, all secretarial 
salaries and office expenses, and paid Rutledge a salary of $1,200 as 
a title abstractor. Allegedly Rutledge, in addition to salary, received 
a total reimbursement of $5,0 11.50. Brill received a total of $5 72.84 
for his services during this period. 
B. The defense, in its opening, alleged that Brill had volunteered 
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his services as an attorney and as a friend, and that Brill completely 
took over Rutledge's practice. The gross during the six months was 
approximately $20,000, whereas it had been in the neighborhood of 
$100,000 to $150,000. The defense alleged that Rutledge had sought 
advice from the Tenth District Committee about the arrangement 
with Brill and the terms of the lease agreement which was drawn up 
but never· signed by Mr. Brill. It was alleged that Rutledge made 
every effort to comply with the order of suspension and that he did 
not engage in the practice of law during this period. 
C. First Witness-Douglas Rosenbaum: 
Rosenbaum testified that he was a builder and was associated with 
Phoenix Properties, Inc., a former client of Rutledge. 
He had known Rutledge since the 1960's and had used him as his 
attorney for title work for about five years. Rosenbaum stated that 
other attorneys on occasion had done work for Phoenix Properties, Inc., 
including possibly Brill. He knew Brill to be a competent attorney and 
that Brill had been a trustee on some of the deed of trust notes. Rut-
ledge told Rosenbaum of his six month suspension, and Rutledge re-
turned a few files to Rosenbaum with a formal notice of the suspen-
sion. No arrangements were made with Rutledge about the legal work 
of Phoenix Properties, Inc. Rosenbaum did refer a number of matters 
to Brill through Rutledge's office during the six months suspension 
period from October 1, 1971 to April 1, 1972. Rosenbaum testified 
that this was a convenience and that he relied upon the office per-
sonnel who were familiar with Phoenix's business transactions and 
requirements. Rosenbaum had never employed Brill or sent a case to 
him prior to October 1, 1971, and did not employ him subsequent to 
April 1, 1972. Rutledge did not tell Rosenbaum that Brill was taking 
over his practice and Brill did not tell Rosenbaum this. The stenog-
raphers in the office told those who called that Rutledge was not 
engaged in the practice of law. 
D. Second Witness-Mr. Edward P. Brill, Jr., attorney at law. 
Brill volunteered as a close friend to handle the work of Rutledge 
shortly before the suspension date. He was not approached by Rut-
ledge. Rutledge and Brill had been· in law school together and were 
fraternity brothers; and Brill had worked for Rutledge as an employee 
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and later as an independent contractor for several years. Brill agreed 
to handle all of Rutledge's title business since he did not want Rutledge 
to lose clients-primarily Phoenix Properties, Inc., Rip Development 
Company, Inc. and J. Fuller Groom Realty Company. He had not 
done work for these clients prior to October 1, 1971. Brill had been 
a practicing attorney since 1951 specializing in property law. He main-
tained an office at 2054 North 14th Street, Arlington, Virginia. 
Brill did not know how the clients were notified to send their busi-
ness to him and does not know what, if anything, Rutledge told them. 
In any event, Brill was to handle any business sent to him during the 
suspension of Rutledge. 
Rutledge prepared a contract and rental agreement covering the 
rent, office expenses, use of a car, etc., which is a part of the record. 
A copy of this agreement was taken to Mr. Henry St. John FitzGerald, 
Chairman of the Tenth District Grievance Committee, for his reaction. 
Mr. FitzGerald suggested some changes to Brill, and stated that he 
would look it over when they were made. Brill never brought the 
agreement back and it was never executed, nor was any written lease 
executed. 
There was an oral agreement between Rutledge and Brill. Brill 
agreed to abide by the terms of this oral agreement provided he was 
able to do so financially. Brill was to pay the following: 
$800.00/month office rent 
$275.00/month equipment rent 
$450.00 /week gross secretarial salaries 
$400.00/week to Rutledge as title abstractor 
Only a total of $1,200 was paid to Rutledge as a title abstractor. 
The office and equipment rent was paid directly to Rutledge. This 
amounted to a total of $4,800 for office rent and $1,650 for equipment 
rent for the six months. Brill established a separate account and paid 
the secretaries and all other office expenses out of the gross income of 
the office. 
Brill was during this time also engaged in his own practice in his 
own office. Brill has the same type of practice as Rutledge. The secre-
taries took care of the daily correspondence. Brill could have handled 
Rutledge's work in his own office but he probably would have needed 
more secretarial help. Brill did come over to Rutledge's office every 
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day to check on things and to schedule loan settlements. Upon being 
advised that he needed an occupancy permit, Brill obtained one. He 
estimated the time spent at three hours a day or 15 hours a week but 
admitted that it was difficult to say exactly. Before the Tenth District 
Committee, he had estimated 4 or 5 hours per month. Brill closed 
about 33 loans during the six month period and came by each morning 
to review any mail that needed his attention and to go over proposed 
closing or settlement statements. 
Rutledge's clients knew Brill was doing the closings. Those wishing 
to arrange for the closings would call the secretaries in Rutledge's office 
and the secretaries arranged the time of the closings with Brill. Rut-
ledge did abstracting work in connection with the loans and Brill would 
go over the title binders and sign them. The secretarial staff drew up 
the deeds, deeds of trust and other loan documents and these were 
checked by Brill. Rutledge did all the title work and saw to the 
preparation of the preliminary papers which were signed by Brill and 
forwarded to the title company. Brill has not represented the three 
clients, Phoenix, Rip, and Groom, directly either before or after the 
suspension period. 
Brill was trying to help a friend. Rutledge took his name off the 
door of the office, changed the building directory and removed legal 
certificates from the wall. All fees were paid to Brill's account. Brill 
told Rutledge that he did not want him to be anything but a title 
examiner during this period. It was not the general practice in the 
locality to hire non-legal personnel to do title work, most title exam-
iners in the area being attorneys. 
During the suspension, Rutledge spent approximatley two months 
in Florida. When not in Florida, Rutledge was in the office almost 
daily. Brill made an effort to maintain the office so that Rutledge 
could move back in after the suspension without interruption. Brill 
was not aware that the actual office rental charge was $439 per month. 
He was paying $800 per month and thus paid more to Rutledge than 
the amount due the landlord. 
E. In lieu of calling Mr. Henry St. John FitzGerald, Chairman 
of the Tenth District Committee, as a witness, the parties stipulated 
that if called he would testify that he never rendered an opinion, either 
negative or affirmative, with regard to the written agreement submitted 
for his review. 
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F. Third Witness-John F. Rutledge, defendant 
Rutledge took the stand in his own behalf after being advised . of 
his right not to testify. He was questioned as an adverse- witness. 
Rutledge testified that he had been a practicing attorney for many 
years specializing in title work. He denied referring any clients di-
rectly or indirectly to Brill or anyone else during the period of suspen-
sion. He had informed his clients that he would be suspended for a 
six month period; that Brill would do the legal work during this time; 
that the office personnel would be retained; that Rutledge would be 
in the office and would work for Brill as a title abstractor. 
Rutledge prepared an agreement, which was not signed, calling 
for rental in the amount of $800 per month for his office space. This 
rental was in excess of Rutledge's own obligation to his landlord. He 
admitted that his actual office rent was $439 per month and that he 
charged Brill $800 per month for office rent and $275 per month for 
equipment rental during the suspension period. A parking fee of $60 
per month was paid by Rutledge. Rutledge thought Brill knew that 
the actual rent was $439 per month based upon a 1967 rental agree-
ment. The $800 amount was arrived at after consultation with a 
C.P.A. When asked why he consulted a C.P.A., Rutledge answered 
"I do not know". Also, Rutledge had made recent substantial im-
provements in the office for his own convenience which had cost ap-
proximately $4,000. The rental area was 1,200 square feet, and Rut-
ledge's landlord was advised that he was subleasing the space. His 
electronic service equipment cost was $175 per month. 
The agreement prepared by Rutledge provided that he was to 
receive $400 per week for his services, but he could not require that Brill 
pay him this amount because the agreement never was signed, and 
because there was not enough money coming in. Rutledge received 
only $1,200 as salary for his working as a title abstractor during the 
six month period, whereas he had been grossing about $18,000 per 
month. His gross for the first nine months of 1971 prior to his suspen-
sion had been in the neighborhood of $160,000. 
Rutledge did not consider that he was practicing law. He removed 
all evidence of his being an attorney from the door of his office and 
the building directory. He delivered his license to practice law to the 
Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Arlington County. 
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Rutledge expressly denied that his arrangement with Brill was a 
device by which he could continue to practice law. Rutledge never 
discussed any legal business with former clients nor referred work to 
other attorneys during the suspension period although he had told 
his former clients that he would be in the office doing the title abstract-
ing work. He testified that he did not in any manner engage in the 
practice of law or render legal advice, and that he in good faith be-
lieved that he was in compliance with the order of suspension. Rut-
ledge stated that he had never been informed by Brill of his contacting 
Mr. FitzGerald relative to the agreement. 
During the six months suspension period, Rutledge was in the 
office daily with the exception of two months spent in Florida during 
two or more visits there. When not in Florida, he would go by the office 
and screen his mail and pick up any files for abstracting. He also 
worked on Boy Scout business which he was involved in. He took no 
calls as an attorney and the secretaries screened his calls and were 
instructed to tell those who called that he could not practice law during 
the suspension. . 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the Court heard argument on 
behalf of Rutledge to dismiss the proceeding on the ground that there 
had been no evidence presented that he was in violation of the suspen-
sion order, and argument on behalf of the Tenth District Committee 
that Rutledge's conduct constituted the indirect practice of law. 
Following a recess to consider the pleadings, exhibits, evidence 
and argument of counsel, the Court recommended and rendered its 
opinion finding the defendant in violation of the suspension order and 
suspending his licence to practice law for a period of three years, to 
which ruling the defendant, by counsel, objected and excepted. 
* * * 
NOTICE OF APPEAL AND ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
Notice Of Appeal 
Pursuant to Rule 5:6 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia, the Defendant, John F. Rutledge, hereby gives notice that he 
appeals from the J udgrnent Order entered in this proceeding on No-
vember 15, 1972, that he will apply for a Supersedeas and that he has 
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filed a written Statement of Proceedings, which pursuant to discus-
sions with counsel for Plaintiff and the Court may be superseded by a 
subsequent statement to be filed herein. 
Assignments Of Error 
The befendant, John F. Rutledge, makes the following assign-
ments of error: 
1. The activities of the Defendant as detailed in the Written 
Statements of Facts did not constitute the direct or indirect practice 
of law. 
2. The Defendant did not refer matters to other lawyers in viola-
tion of the Court's order of September 27, 1971. 
3. The Defendant did not otherwise violate the terms of the said 
order. 
4. The Court's imposition of a three-yf"..ar suspension of the De-
fendant's license to practice law, in addition to the prior six-month 
suspension, is erroneous as being excessively harsh and oppressive. 
* * * 
